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Slowness logistics
Towards a new time orientation?
Gilles Paché
ABSTRACT. Works conducted in logistics management mostly
emphasize the importance of a ‘time compression’ strategy to 
develop a sustainable competitive advantage. At the level of the
design, manufacturing or distribution of products to consumers,
high-speed orientation is now considered to be a universal source of
performance. Drawing from current developments in the French
food retailing industry, the paper points to a possible alternative path
based on ‘slowness’ logistics. This new time orientation is set in a
context of the ‘theatricalization of low prices’ adopted by an 
increasing number of large retailers. KEY WORDS • logistics • 
management • price policy • slowness • time-based strategy
Introduction
Throughout the 1990s, the major home shopping companies fought a regular
commercial war in France, not in the field of diversity and quality of products
offered, not even in the field of attractive prices, but in the field of delivery on
time. It was a period of ruthless battle over a guarantee of delivery of products
in a few hours, rather than in a few days, once customers had phoned their order.
At the same time, and using an identical mode, hypermarkets started presenting
the immediate availability of products as an advertising asset, betting that a low
level of stock out should mechanically increase customers’ loyalty. These situa-
tions have something in common: they consider that logistical performance in
terms of rapidity and delivery on time represents a major source of competitive
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advantage, and only those companies able to implement a ‘time compression’
policy should be able to avoid losing market shares. The time-based strategy
(TBS) found its roots in a context where execution speed became a formidable
weapon, sometimes difficult for competitors to emulate in the short term.
This exploratory article takes a view opposed to the conventional one of 
service-oriented logistics. Its aim is to show that the economic conditions con-
cerning the price of energy will oblige companies to change strategy radically.
In the future, the degradation of logistical performance will be the only possible
way, and it will be necessary to justify this new deal to the consumer. Several
examples drawn from the French retailing industry show that some companies
have decided to voluntarily reduce their level of service quality, by reducing the
frequency and speed of deliveries, within the setting of a new marketing
strategy: the ‘theatricalization of low prices’. These companies are succeeding
in increasing their market share by explaining to customers that untidiness in
stores and the multiplication of stock outs will be the counterpart of a low price 
positioning. A new form of inter-firm competition could thus emerge, in total
contradiction with the last 30 years of logistical evolution: competition founded
on low speed and low service strategy as best practice.
In the first part, I recall the origins of TBS, by placing it in an organizational
and logistical perspective. It will be possible then to highlight the main criticism
expressed over it, particularly the fact that consumers are not systematically
high-speed oriented, thus opening the way for an alternative strategy based on
the deliberate degradation of logistical customer service; in a way, the ideology
of ‘real time’ seems to be thoroughly questioned these days (Hope, 2006). The
second part focuses on the case of the French retailing industry, which has been
subjected to profound transformations over the last few years, with the emer-
gence of low service/low price-oriented retail formats. The third part reviews
this emergence of new logistical rules turning away from the cult of speed and
possibly likely to experience quick success with the end of cheap crude oil in the
years to come.
The Rise and Fall of Time-based Strategy
To win the battle against lost time or time deemed unproductive in the manage-
ment of operations, to proceed ever faster in the design, production and distrib-
ution of new products or new services, appears to be the current leitmotiv of
companies trying to get an edge over their competitors. Time here appears as an
‘explicit strategic variable’, in the words of Lacroux and Nourry (1997). A real
consensus seems to be emerging around this position, in marketing, in organiza-
tional analysis, in strategic management, in sociology and in supply chain 
management. The ability to reduce time-to-market is thus the symbol of winning
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strategies, condemning companies with a legacy of slowness to failure, as they
are unable to develop organizational procedures facilitating speed of execution
and agility. Is this so inevitable? A trend in criticism is currently questioning the
managerial dogma developed by TBS.
Time Orientation: An Organizational and Logistical Perspective
For more than a century, the whole history of industrial capitalism has been
based on a permanent search for productivity gains by trying to reduce the 
execution times of operations. It is not surprising that Coriat (1982) put the
image of a stop-watch at the heart of his analysis of scientific management,
imagined by F. Taylor and implemented by H. Ford. The compulsory factor for
increasing the productivity of workers toiling together in a factory lies in a 
rigorous control of time and motion. This philosophy of the ‘fight against time’
in order to avoid workers’ idleness and the waste of resources later spread to all
areas of activity, by adopting increasingly sophisticated organizational forms,
one of the best known examples remaining the production line. Morgan
(1986/1997), for his part, uses the machine metaphor to describe a firm as a set
of well-oiled gears, whose perfect synchronization is a guarantee of efficiency.
The machine metaphor considers it is essential to plan strict operation man-
agement procedures, and also product manufacturing and distribution processes,
to reduce as much as possible operating costs of firms as organizations, as much
as possible through a widespread dissemination of clock-time (Hassan, 2003).
This reduction of operating costs is the key factor of success for conquering new
markets by developing a cost leadership strategy, as Porter (1980) explains. A
firm must be broken down into different complementary activities that must be
managed in the most efficient manner and coordinated according to a ‘global’
principle. For example, the performance of marketing activities relies on an 
efficient use of market segmentation and strategic positioning techniques, but
also at the same time, on taking into account the productivity constraints 
characteristic of manufacturing activities.
The issue extends well beyond the limits of a single firm. In most cases, 
several firms work together in order to design, manufacture and sell products (or
services). For example, L’Oréal designs a new shampoo in its R & D depart-
ment, then manufactures it in its factories, but Wal-Mart or Carrefour will be the
firms selling it in their stores. Therefore inter-organizational relationships define
the time constraints that need to be respected jointly by several firms, the only
possible way to deliver the right product, at the right place in the right time to
consumers. Accordingly, these firms belong to the same supply chain,1 whose
efficient management requires not independent, but shared decisions. This is the
basis of the supply chain management (SCM) approach. Its objective is to
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increase the reactivity of manufacturing and retailing firms all faced with a 
highly volatile environment (Christopher, 2005).
From this point of view, the organizational perspective of time orientation has
experienced a renewed interest in the last few years in view of the movement of
modern economies toward a globalization of exchanges and the search for 
efficiency through a continuous improvement of consumer responsiveness. The
new competition rules force manufacturing and retailing firms to completely
reorganize their supply chains to increase value creation. This means new strate-
gies of time rationalization to eliminate all the steps of industrial, logistical and
commercial processes that do not generate any value; the ideal model is finally
an ideal of time consumption close to zero (Brondoni, 2000). As Bluedorn and
Denhardt (1988) aptly note in their study of time and organizations: 
Time is closely related to organizational productivity and that time can be viewed
as a resource to be managed in the pursuit of organizational objectives . . . In
modern organizations, time is considered one of several scarce resources, one to be
measured and manipulated in the interest of organizational efficiency and 
effectiveness (Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988: 303).
At the end of their article, Bluedorn and Denhardt (1988) suggest three main
subjects of research on the organizational approach to time. First, we should try
to better understand relationships between time management, strategies and
organizational structures. Then, we should identify which type of time manage-
ment is most efficient in terms of strategies and organizational structures.
Finally, we should thoroughly study the influence of contextual variables on
time management. This last subject matter obviously leads to major questioning
on the explanatory factors of companies’ time orientation. The most urgent issue
to study is undoubtedly this one: is there only one way to consider temporal 
performance? The answer seemed positive for some years, since the develop-
ment of a time compression strategy and, more widely, of a TBS, is presented as
the sole manner to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. This consensus
poses a problem as it minimizes the influence of contextual variables associated
with environmental changes.
Fundamentals of Time Compression
TBS has taken up a significant place in the professional and academic literature
since the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Stalk (1988), then
Stalk and Hout (1990), consultants in the Boston Consulting Group, were early
in pointing out a new form of competition between firms, no longer based 
on cost leadership, but on the ability to use speed as a source of competitive
advantage. According to Stalk and Hout (1990), the issue is no longer to reduce
314 TIME & SOCIETY 16(2/3)
costs to sell cheaper, as the Japanese have managed to do. It is also and above all
critical to increase the degree of customer responsiveness. For a firm, the time-
based competitive advantage is identifiable at several levels: at the level of 
manufacturing activities, with the maximization of production runs without
waste or unnecessary work-in-process (WIP) immobilizations; at distribution
level, with delivery of the right product at the right time to satisfy customer
demand; at the level of design and innovation, with the reduction of the period
between the idea of creating a new product and its effective launch on the 
market. Winning strategies lie on a time compression scenario, combining the
different levels described earlier.
In about 10 years, TBS has experienced a significant widening of its scope of
analysis. Leaving behind studies centred on firms, most authors are now increas-
ingly and systematically considering a network of firms associated in the opera-
tion of supply chains. The activities of design, production, distribution and sales
of products involve several firms establishing exchange relationships between
them. An overall time-based advantage may emerge only if the firms in the same
supply chain coordinate efficiently, so that time compression in one specific
point of the supply chain is not cancelled by delays in production or distribution
runs in other points. This is why it is possible to present SCM as managerial
skills with the ambition to obtain time and space compression to improve 
customer responsiveness (Ciscel and Smith, 2005).
In brief, we are now in a new reality – that of an industrial organization where
factories are no longer at the heart of the value creation system, but have been
replaced by firms able to control the diversity, volumes and qualities of 
consumer products. Flow monitoring inside supply chain processes takes on a
critical dimension that third party logistics and large retailers control perfectly.
Rather than speaking of ‘flexible production,’ as Ciscel and Smith (2005) did, I
prefer referring to a ‘supply chain system’ to underline the central importance of
product flow, which must be totally fluid in time and space (see Table 1). It
should be noted that many researchers in applied economics are following the
same type of reflection from a measurement of time value in transport
(Conférence Européenne des Ministres des Transports [CEMT], 2005). Their
objective is to justify in which specific situation an investment in facilities such
as motorways, airports or railway bridges is legitimate, in view of the cost 
for taxpayers and in function of the reduction of access time between several
locations within a land area.
As said before, displacing the ‘centre of gravity’ of value creation, and 
the coordination constraints to be respected to achieve an overall time-based
advantage, requires an integration of logistical processes and, more widely, of
decision-making processes. ‘The way stakeholders coordinate in time with other
stakeholders in the environment is of critical significance for deciding to invest
or to launch new products’ (Demil et al., 2001: 83). This explains the importance
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given to inter-organizational repartitioning, to the coordination of operations
between supply chain members, as we underlined before, and to their perfect
communication. This is a requisite condition to achieve an optimal level of 
time compression. The cases studied most often refer to a dyadic approach, for
example relations between a manufacturer and its suppliers (Carter and
Hendrick, 1997), but they can (must) be generalized to all relations throughout a
supply chain, from suppliers’ suppliers to large retailers’ customers. The objec-
tive is to reduce the response times of an entire supply chain, since competition
is now between supply chains, not between the firms in each supply chain
(Christopher, 2005).
If the idea of a competition between supply chains is accepted, it is obviously
the supply chain having the most efficient TBS that is durably going to get ahead
of the other supply chains in the competitive arena. For most observers, only
advanced cooperation policies between firms will help achieving this result, 
particularly through a reduction of waste and waiting time at the various inter-
faces of supply chains (Balsmeir and Voisin, 1996; Sauvage, 2001). However,
firms will certainly be part of several supply chains at the same time.
Consequently, the issue is not to analyze each supply chain independently from
the others, but to see whether a firm belonging to several supply chains brings
the same time-based competitive advantage to each. The customer responsive-
ness of third party logistics companies may thus be standardized for several 
supply chains, but the TBS of each supply chain will depend on the quality of
interactions between the third party logistics firm and the other supply chain
members (manufacturing and retailing firms).
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TABLE 1
Paradigms of space–time: From the factory system to the supply chain system
Dimension Factory system Supply chain system
Dominant economic sector Manufacturing Logistics and retail trade
Spatial organization of production Linear Nodes or bush
Temporal organization of production Sequential Simultaneous
Corporate form Vertical form Supply chain network
Spatial location of production Consolidated Decentralized
Overall character of space–time Fixed and predictable Mobile and fluid
Source: Adapted from Ciscel and Smith (2005: 432)
Criticism of Time Compression
TBS gives rise to many interrogations as to its relevance. A large part of these
interrogations do not question time and speed as a source of competitive advan-
tage, but question the final aim of strategic action. As Helms and Ettkin (2000)
summed up neatly, the issue is not to go ever faster, but also to use the speed
acquired to create a sustainable competitive advantage. For example, consumers
do not buy quick delivery or execution, but an optimum availability depending
on their expectations. This is particularly the case in online grocery where 
consumers do not necessarily look for ultra-quick delivery, but expect delivery
within a precise (and previously negotiated) time window, when they are at
home (Paché, 2004). Rather than advising them of a delivery within two days, at
any time during each day, it is preferable for e-tailers to promise delivery with-
in three days, but between 7 pm and 8 pm and keep this promise. Here the idea
of timing as a situational time concept reoccurs, inspired by the theory of Kairos:
the major aspect is not to go fast, but rather to know how to wait for the right
moment for beginning or doing something (Adam, 2004).
Another more radical criticism questions the foundations of a TBS based on
an explicit or implicit assumption: consumers are particularly sensitive to the
fact of having the right product at the right time to satisfy their needs. This
assumption is based on common sense. If consumers do not have the right 
product at the right time at their disposal, for lack of coordination in the supply
chain, they will be frustrated and choose another product or another point of
sale; consumer behaviour confronted with stock outs in stores has been analysed
in depth by the marketing and retailing literature since the 1970s. But are con-
sumers still sensitive to a complete availability of products? This is forgetting
that the process of value creation must be centred on the customer-perceived
value of products. Research on SCM teaches us that material and immaterial
resources must be present at the right time (and place) throughout a supply
chain, but this allocation will depend directly on the real value given to time by
consumers; more exactly on the value attached to a maximum availability of
products (Wilding and Newton, 1996).
It is impossible to have a universal approach to the value given to time by con-
sumers. When customers in a hypermarket or supermarket buy convenience
goods, they refer to a mix in which products deemed important and others
deemed less important are associated, and the tolerated level of stock out is 
obviously going to vary from one customer to another. Let us imagine that a
consumer is organizing a romantic dinner for two and wishes to prepare his/her
companion’s favourite dish for the occasion. In this context, the ingredients of
this dish are very significant and any stock out in store may generate intolerable
frustration. This might not be the case when the same consumer prepares the
same dish for his/her own consumption. An efficient time-based distribution
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means offering a maximum availability of consumers’ favourite products, while
making do with an average availability for other products; the overall level of
availability will thus be the combination of various levels of services received
by an individual customer (Zinn et al., 2002).
In managerial terms, the approach is quite difficult. Going back to the 
example of the intimate dinner, consumers’ expectations obviously vary with
the purchasing situation. For the same product, depending on backgrounds and
individuals, a level of availability may be perceived as excellent, just satis-
factory or poor. The result is that TBS must rely on a situational segmentation,
by identifying situations of purchase for which the value of time is highest, and
in which the price consumers are ready to pay for the maximum availability of
products is deemed important. This idea of logistical segmentation, developed
by Christopher (1986) and Hise (1995), means that some consumers will prob-
ably be ready to accept a downgraded service, with frequent stockouts, if a large
retailer offers them as compensation highly attractive prices for products
deemed not so important.
Conducting a low-price strategy, rather than a TBS, means that a manu-
facturer, a third party logistics firm and a large retailer (as partners in the same
supply chain), will be able to coordinate their actions to reduce logistical costs:
for example, by working on a less frequent delivery of products in store, and
consequently on a lowering of transport costs, even if the result is an increase in
stock outs. Hence, the provocative idea of downgrading the logistical customer
service, which could appear to be a source of competitive advantage to supply
chain members, is confronted with low-price-oriented consumers in specific 
purchasing situations. The French food retailing industry, experiencing 
extensive changes for the past 10 years, is an interesting playground for 
discussing the relevance of this idea, in reference to the inter-type competition
now opposing two main retail formats: hypermarkets and hard discount 
stores.
Understanding the French Food Retailing Context
For many years, the dominant retail format in France was the hypermarket retail
format, characterized by high customer responsiveness. Hypermarkets built
their high price/high service positioning on the reliability of logistical and 
merchandising operations. They relied on the progressive development of 
cooperative strategies throughout the supply chain with their suppliers and 
third party logistics to reduce cycle times, but also on coordinated actions to
accelerate the design and introduction of new products as in a trade marketing
approach. With the arrival of hard discount stores, new, highly aggressive com-
petitors favouring a low price/low service positioning, the TBS of hypermarkets
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is being questioned and has produced contrasting responses, between re-
enchantment and deliberate deterioration of the logistical customer service.
The Development of the Hard Discount Retail Format
The quick growth of hard discount in France (and more generally in Europe)
represents a major break in the dynamics of the food retailing industry. The hard
discount retail format was born in post-war, devastated Germany at the initiative
of the Albrecht brothers, creators of Aldi. Their wish was to propose food 
products to consumers in small-size stores, with a plain and very simple 
presentation. Hard discount made its appearance in France only at the end of the
1970s, with the opening of the Ed stores belonging to the Carrefour Group. The
Ed stores were then located around Paris, and on the model of the hard discount
invented by the Albrecht brothers, they offered a product assortment reduced to
550 references. The real birth of hard discount in France was in fact the arrival
of Aldi at Croix, near Lille, in 1988, followed by Lidl and Norma in 1989. A few
large French food retailers managing hypermarkets and supermarkets reacted
very quickly and opened their own hard discount stores (CDM then Netto for
Intermarché, Le Mutant for the Coopératives de Normandie, Dia for Promodès),
but the growth of the retail format depended essentially on the German hard 
discounters.
Throughout the 1990s, the hard discount retail format developed at an 
unrestrained pace, with an average of one store opening per day. At the same
time, the opening of hypermarkets in France was slowed down by the Royer Act
(1973), then the Raffarin Act (1996), as the political objective was to give the
illusion of a protection for the single-unit independent stores threatened with
disappearance.2 The hypermarket, symbol of the commercial revolution in
France, is a ‘shopping factory’ of imposing dimensions (a little over 5,000 m2 in
general, with stores sometimes larger than 15,000 m2). Hard discount stores,
with their average of 600 to 700 m2, often escape from the provision of these
laws, all the more so as they are often located in underprivileged areas. While
authorizations to open hypermarkets have become scarce, authorizations to open
hard discount stores have multiplied. As shown in Table 2, the total sales area of
hard discount stores increased by 100 per cent between 1995 and 2005, while the
sales area of hypermarkets increased by only 27 per cent.
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the hard discount retail format has been the
uncontested winner of household consumption changes. Buying convenience
goods at a hard discounter’s was perceived as shameful for a long time; this
retail format was reserved for the poorer households, for whom hypermarkets
and their high prices were becoming inaccessible. This is no longer the case.
According to a study conducted by TNS Secodip, 67.7 per cent of French house-
PACHÉ: SLOWNESS LOGISTICS 319
holds said they shopped regularly at a hard discounter’s in 2005 (against 38 
per cent in 1998), and 9 per cent of households said that a hard discounter was
their main store. According to the same study, from December 1992 to June
2005, household expenditure in hard discount stores increased from 1.6 per cent
to 13.4 per cent of the total of purchases of convenience goods and fresh prod-
ucts. The reasons for this success are known: the stagnation of wages, massive
unemployment among the young, a growing social exclusion, but also, paradox-
ically, the desire of the wealthy classes to save on convenience goods and spend
their money instead on travel, sophisticated multimedia services (Internet
access, mobile phones, etc.), or on entertainment, etc. As the hard discount retail
format flourishes, hypermarkets unavoidably suffer.
The ‘Marketing Alignment’ of the Hypermarket Retail Format
For more than 30 years, the hypermarket has been the retail format best symbol-
izing the international success of the ‘French exception’, that of a typical store
stocking food and non-food products under the same roof. Although French con-
sumers have become blasé, faced with the diversity of the product assortment
offered by a conventional hypermarket, foreign visitors are surprised. At least 30
to 40 per cent of the sales area is dedicated to non-food products such as house-
hold appliances, jewellery, mobile phones, books and DVDs, PCs and printers,
not to speak of gardening products. It is even possible sometimes to buy tickets for
rock concerts or plays, to subscribe to an Internet operator, even to book a trip to
the Caribbean for your next holidays. Each category of products is presented in a
homogeneous little world of its own a ‘univers de consommation’ (consumer
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TABLE 2
Comparative development of hard discount stores and hypermarkets in France
1990 1995 2000 2003 2005
Hard discount retail format
Number of stores 166 1794 2539 3207 3741
Total sales area (m2) – 1,215,000 1,676,000 2,066,000 2,442,000
Average area per store (m2) – 679 660 644 653
Hypermarket retail format
Number of stores 851 1074 1155 1264 1344
Total sales area (m2) 4,590,000 6,100,000 6,623,000 7,454,000 7,728,000
Average area per store (m2) 5395 5680 5734 5897 5750
ecosystem) whose polished decor and adapted merchandising create a pleasant
and friendly atmosphere. For some observers, this is even a unique model whose
success is explained by the fierce wish to offer a multitude of products and 
services to consumers, in a pleasant commercial environment transforming the
shopping activity into a gratifying experience (Filser et al., 2001).
Of course, the rise of the hard discount format has deeply modified the rules
of the game. It means that French consumers finally accept being ‘disenchanted’
when they shop in plain, bare stores, offering a limited product assortment and
few marketing customer services, if this enables them to get good bargains.
Hypermarkets understood this quickly, and even if hard discounters continue to
gain market shares, the signs that they are running out of steam are discernible
since mid-2005. For example, the average sum spent during each visit has
decreased for the first time in 10 years (21.3 euros). According to some
observers, the current reversal is explained by the first effects of the counter-
attack of hypermarkets developing their own low-price private labels and, for
some of them, launching a hard discount space directly in their stores (Auchan,
Casino).
An interview given by the Director of Marketing of Auchan confirms that this
is perhaps the time for the return of a sort of disenchantment (Cuthbertson,
2005). Auchan now wishes to ‘make it simple’ to compress costs as much as
possible and to efficiently compete with hard discounters, a retail format that
large food retailers do not possess. The declared objective is to shorten cus-
tomers’ comings and goings in the hypermarket by reducing the assortment,
after a golden age during which Auchan presented itself as the specialist of
choice and variety. If reducing the complexity of the offer is felt by the Director
of Marketing as an advantage for consumers (make their buying process easier),
it is clear that the issues for Auchan lie elsewhere: a greater buying power with
suppliers and a massification of flows through warehouses so as to obtain a 
better quantity discount, and consequently to reduce selling prices in stores. The
strategy adopted by Auchan should not have any negative impact on the store
image. As Broniarczyk et al. (1998) demonstrated, the moderate reduction of the
number of references has no effect on consumers’ perception of the product
assortment. When their favourite references remain available, consumers do not
notice the disappearance of other complementary references or the potential
reorganization of store shelves. The issue, consequently, is to identify exactly
the favourite references of the different customer segments.
Disenchantment has gone even further with Casino and Leclerc. Whole parts
of some of their hypermarkets are occasionally or permanently transformed into
warehouses or hangars, with an incredible accumulation of podiums, palettes,
cut cases, racks, etc., that seem to be staged on purpose to create a discount
image (Badot and Paché, 2006). The presence of piles of products or bulky
packs creates a store atmosphere visually symbolizing the principle of
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economies of scale for consumers: very low selling prices made possible by
mass purchases by large retailers. Similarly, the placing of trolleys of products
in aisles or of products out of their packaging creates the impression of a clear-
ance sale, and therefore once again, lower prices and good bargains, as in the
hard discount retail format. We can speak of the theatricalization of low prices,
which undoubtedly influences the way of conceiving what the logistical (and
timing) performance must be.
Logistics Management: Between High Speed and Slowness
The academic literature dedicated to retail logistics keeps stressing the 
importance of performance criteria associated with reactivity and flexibility, to
develop a time-based advantage. One of the objectives is to reduce stock outs in
stores to increase the level of consumer satisfaction (Fitzsimons, 2000). More
generally, it is accepted that logistics has to take an active part in the con-
struction of a ‘service-oriented management’. The theatricalization of low
prices questions this managerial dogma, by emphasizing other key elements of 
marketing positioning, little or not studied for the time being. The profound
changes that western countries are going to experience with the end of cheap oil
are probably going to accelerate the emergence of a new model mainly based on
resource savings; large retailers will deliberately have to accept a downgrading
of their logistical customer service, and favour slowness logistics, abandoning
the cult of speed.
From Service-oriented Management to the Theatricalization of Low Prices
When we analyse the evolution of the large French food retailers’ logistical
strategy, it is obvious that their different actions were at first to attempt to 
optimize transport, storage and handling operations from factories to store
shelves. The problem was then to reduce logistical costs and to avoid wasting
resources to improve the price positioning of hypermarkets (Filser et al., 2001).
In a second stage, with the increase of intra-type competition, the large French
food retailers made the mistake of favouring logistics customer service only,
particularly respecting delivery deadlines. The dominating theory was that, in
addition to looking for the lowest prices, consumers no longer accepted stock
outs that generate a feeling of dissatisfaction, which could lead them to change
stores. If one refers to the different time dimensions described by Bouder-Pailler
(2002) in Table 3, recalling some of the time dimensions studied by Batsch
(2002), delivery on time and urgency (short term) undeniably occupy a central
place, to the detriment of period, horizon and trajectory (medium and long
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term). Strategies of re-enchantment were to lead to overbids in logistics cus-
tomer service. The shopping experience would obviously be a real source of
value for consumers only if spectacularly staged products were always present
and in sufficient quantities.
Many studies conducted in France, and also in Europe, confirm the slow drift
of retail logistics toward the continuous search for an increasingly sophisticated
logistics customer service, to the detriment of logistical costs (Duong et al.,
1998; Colin, 2002). In the 1990s, an excellent company was able to conduct a
time compression strategy, even if this meant more frequent and costly trans-
port. The phenomenon also occurred in the United Kingdom. Similarly, to stage
their products, the large French food retailers did not hesitate to use a lot of
equipment and staff, even if this meant a significant increase in handling costs.
The growth of the hard discount retail format and the choice of new strategies to
‘make it simple’ completely changed the rules of the game. The theatricaliza-
tion of low prices, creating a store atmosphere close to that of hard discounters,
leads to a rediscovery of the virtues of more thrifty logistics. This echoes, in
terms of the demand chain, the analysis of Walters and Rainbird (2004), replac-
ing consumers at the centre of the value creation process: to make use of market
opportunities to maximize the firm’s overall value chain requires implementing
an effective combination of ‘logistical capabilities’ and ‘demand chain effec-
tiveness’.
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TABLE 3
Strategic implications of the different time dimensions
Time 
dimensions Definition Example of managerial objectives
Deadline Time given to conduct an activity Respect a product delivery time
previously notified to customer
Urgency An activity that must be conducted Supply stocked-out store as soon
in an extremely limited time as possible to avoid losing sales
Period Division of time into important Plan the number of products that
events can be stored in a regional 
warehouse during one quarter
Horizon Time perspective within which Plan the firm’s development in 
an action falls the medium and long term in 
relation to its estimated sales
Trajectory Trajectory or schedule to fulfil Enable the firm to develop by
an objective relying on its competences, skills,
culture, etc.
Source: Adapted from Bouder-Pailler (2002: 93)
A palette or a rack left in the middle of an aisle may appear to be the result of
a malfunction in a hypermarket, just like regular stock outs. On the other hand,
it is possible that this palette or rack may for consumers mean a rather untidy 
store, where they however have the pleasant feeling of making excellent 
bargains, thanks to savings made in personnel management. The proof is there:
‘bargains’ are so obvious that the large retailer can no longer control supplies,
hence the multiplication of stock outs. Store disorganization and the deteriora-
tion of the customer logistics service could send a powerful signal to consumers,
that of a low price strategy enabling them to avoid shopping at hard discount
stores, as they can find just as good things by shopping directly in hypermarkets.
In such a context, the old models of logistical management must be revised, like
the performance criteria on which they are based, particularly in terms of 
maximization of the logistics customer service.
Large retailers desiring to develop a strategy of disenchantment for their
hypermarkets will find an advantage in purposefully deteriorating the logistics
customer service and countering lastingly the development of hard discounters.
This is a provocative proposition, but it refers to an idea developed by
Christopher (1986), in which consumers build their own store image in relation
to a number of factors. For example, a well-kept store, offering a diversified
product assortment, with many attendants available for help and advice, gives
the image of a large retailer favouring a high-quality marketing customer 
service. So consumers expect to pay high prices, knowing that low prices will 
be the necessary counterpart of a poor-quality marketing customer service.
Consequently, if a large retailer wants its hypermarkets to attract consumers
who have defected to the hard discount retail format, it must absolutely return to
poor performing logistics. This will be consistent with the theatricalization of
low prices, and will allow the cost savings required to conduct a successful low-
price strategy.
If the scenario of the purposeful deterioration of the logistics customer service
is confirmed, it could give birth to a ‘wheel of retail logistics’, aligned on the
model of McNair’s (1957) wheel of retailing. When introducing a new retail 
format, logistics management is simplistic, without a real desire to be a tool of
differentiation. As the number of competitors operating in a retail format
increases, each firm will try to build consumer loyalty by improving its logistics
customer service. However, it will then be threatened by a new retail format
whose logistics management is again simplistic. If customers become increas-
ingly reactive to low prices, the older retail format must react by returning to less
costly logistical solutions. This has been obviously the case of Carrefour in
France since January 2005. The group decided to stop the implementation of
new logistical partnerships with its main suppliers, the objective of which was to
increase logistics customer service with the adoption of collaborative manage-
ment tools. The priority is to reduce logistical costs, for example by forcing 
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suppliers to put their products in secondary packaging eliminating any useless
handling in stores. In so doing, Carrefour tries to reproduce in its hypermarkets
the basic principles of hard discount, and takes part in the invention of a new
generation of hypermarket.
In brief, it is necessary to encourage logisticians to go and meet the marketing
community. Since Babin’s et al. (1994) contribution, nobody ignores the fact
that if consumers go to a point of sale, it is as much to buy a product (utilitarian
considerations) as to live a ‘shopping experience’ and look for bargains or for
pleasure and entertainment (hedonistic considerations). Research conducted by
Filser et al. (2003) in the French context confirms the significant value some
consumers give to the pleasure felt during the shopping activity: meeting other
people, taking part in social life, but also and above all having the feeling of
making bargains. In other words, it is not certain whether the perfect availability
of products, in perfectly neat and well-supplied gondolas, may always be the
source of intense satisfaction. In contrast, an ‘organized disorder’ could partici-
pate in the disenchantment desired by large retailers . . . and enjoyed by con-
sumers. This implies that logisticians must not persist in trying to implement a
well-oiled machinery, in Morgan’s (1986/1997) terminology, but must reflect
on the type of logistical organization required to successfully establish the 
marketing strategy of large retailers. This transformation appears all the more
urgent as the business situation is likely to experience a significant upheaval
within the next few years. A new logistical model, that we will call slowness
logistics, should be at the heart of a growth that is more respectful of Planet
Earth’s resources.
Slowness Logistics in the New Economic Environment
Even if awareness is not yet general, the end of cheap energy is now an 
established fact. It heralds a mutation that will prove painful for our societies
with the last throes of an economy entirely based on oil for more than a century.
It is clear that this mutation will have a strong direct impact on transport 
systems, requiring a complete restructuring of logistics organization modes,
something Georgescu-Roegen (1971/1999) had very early anticipated in refer-
ence to the entropy law without meeting any echo within the scientific commu-
nity. The retailing industry relies massively on road transport to supply its
stores, located in urban areas. It directly depends on the price of oil and its 
evolution, in the absence of alternative and credible energy sources.
Although experts disagree on the exact date, an oil peak will be reached in the
next few years before daily production inexorably decreases in the world. This
process will result in a continuous rise in the price of fuels whose effects will
probably be catastrophic for large retailers (more than 50 per cent of their 
PACHÉ: SLOWNESS LOGISTICS 325
logistics costs are made of transport costs, much higher than storage costs). To
continue with the theatricalization of low prices, it seems probable that all 
possible solutions will be resorted to, particularly through a severe-energy 
saving policy, based on fewer trips to stores, for example, even if this means
downgrading logistical customer service, and forcing consumers to accept this.
From this point of view, transformations in the way individuals consider the
management of their time could offer an unhoped-for way out for large retailers.
Of course, it would be excessive to think that slowness logistics is becoming
the rule governing the operation of all supply chains. A more likely scenario is
to consider a coexistence of time compression and slowness logistics in the 
supply chain strategy of large retailers. For local products, fashionable products
or fresh produce with a short expiry date, reactivity and reliability undoubtedly
remain important elements in logistics management. On the other hand, for
products whose manufacturing is relocated in low-cost countries, for example
bottom-of-the-line textiles and household appliances, the criterion of lowest
possible cost of transport is essential, requiring massive dispatching, and
respecting that a high level of logistical customer service is no longer an
absolute priority.
Industrial reality is like the superimposition of two logistical systems: a
system based on geographical proximity (reactivity and reliability as sources of
competitive advantage) and a system based on distance (low cost as source of
competitive advantage) (Paché, 2006). Undoubtedly, French food retailers are
successfully implementing global sourcing strategies from low-cost countries
for a growing number of convenience goods (Filser et al., 2001). This means that
the logistical system based on distance, although preventing any time com-
pression considering the distances to cover by sea transport, has become an 
efficient business model in an economic and societal environment where values
associated with ‘ever increasing speed’ are strongly questioned.
We have been witnessing for several years a more or less violent questioning
of the superiority of speed in western societies (Hassan, 2003; Parkins, 2004).
Following Honoré’s (2005) iconoclastic reflections, some observers dispute the
legitimacy of individuals to live in a permanent state of urgency at work, in 
private life or in consumption activities. They militate in favour of a systematic
questioning of the dictatorship of Chronos, and promote ‘dropping out’
(Carayol, 2005). For them, slowness must thwart the cult of short-lived fads and
the search for an immediate satisfaction of all needs, including the minor ones,
represented by the race toward artificial happiness: consume more and faster. It
is true that an increasing number of individuals looking for some inner peace
aspire to new life tempos, enjoying occasional inaction, or even a degree of 
laziness. It seems probable that as they are trying to escape the perpetual motion,
they will accept a temporary stock out in store with relative resignation.
This type of behaviour may be interpreted, as Becker (1965) did, from works
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studying the modes of time allocation by consumers. It is necessary to distin-
guish two possible modes of allocation: (1) an allocation based on the obligation
to dedicate time to a number of professional and/or personal activities; (2) a 
discretionary allocation based on a relative freedom to make use of time
(Hendrix et al., 1979). For example, individuals may decide to spend a lot of
time shopping if they obtain a significant gratification from the activity. This
may lead them to browse in stores, looking for bargains, and to accept the 
occasional unavailability of such and such product, which finally corresponds to
a kind of cat and mouse game between the store and the consumer. In her 
literature review, Bergadaà (1988–9) highlights the valorization of recreational
activities better to understand time allocation strategies. As she points out in 
reference to research conducted in sociology, time is but one attribute of the
shopping activity, and consumers valorize various time segments in a different
way. To browse in a store and postpone a purchase because of a stock out does
not necessarily give rise to dissatisfaction.
Implementing a new management model based on slowness logistics will
probably require extensive communication work from large retailers to con-
sumers. We will have to be able to replace the well-known ‘I want it all and I
want it now’ of service-oriented logistics, by a provocative ‘just some of it,
today, tomorrow or the day after’. The objective will be to stress the emergence
of a new harmony between individuals and their consumption rates, which also
means that firms stop focusing on the acceleration of their activities to favour
processes creating value for consumers (Ehret, 2002). For example, one can 
easily imagine advertising campaigns playing on the concept: ‘Stock out in
store: is it so tragic to wait a little to buy more?’, highlighting the false urgency
of the immediate purchase of such and such a convenience good.
Time management would then become an efficient discrimination tool of
demand for vendors (Zollinger and Desmet, 1998). Traditionally, the academic
literature views discrimination by giving value to the product itself through an
artificially scarce offer ( = occasional and scheduled availability of products to
propose good bargains to consumers). We can suggest another way, that of 
creating dis-utilities for consumers by systematically introducing delays for
their purchases ( = random availability of products depending on grouped and
more economical arrivals).3 This mutation will not occur without questioning
the cult of performance, or without a profound change of minds. It involves con-
necting the deliberate postponement of purchases not to consumers’ psycho-
logical checks (Batsch, 2002), but to a rational behaviour in a context of
differentiated value given to availability and therefore to time: a probably
unavoidable mutation in a controlled growth society that will not be able to
withstand the wasting of resources by service-oriented logistics much longer.
It would be consequently erroneous to believe that the move of French large
retailers towards the theatricalization of low prices and slowness logistics can
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be summed up by the simple transformation of a threat into an opportunity. The
evolution of logistics management is certainly a part of a larger ‘slowness trend’
appearing as the answer to the cult of urgency and its excesses – psychological
‘burnout’, psychosomatic disorders, etc. (Aubert, 2003; Carayol, 2005). For 
this ‘slowness trend’ to develop in a sustainable way, it will be necessary for
consumers to accept the idea of a number of sacrifices in their everyday life, for
example delay (or cancellation) of some of their purchases. For if the strategy of
French food retailers is irretrievably to downgrade their logistical customer 
service to improve their profitability, there will be an increasing number of 
temporary stock outs. They may increase consumers’ frustration or irritation, if
they are forced to go back to a store several times or to go to several stores to
find some products. In this case, it is unlikely that they may experience any
hedonistic feeling of well-being in their shopping activity, quite the reverse.
The aspiration to new life tempos, as introduced by Parkins (2004) or Honoré
(2005), therefore requires, in parallel, accepting a new way of consuming, 
particularly of consuming in a less compulsive way, including by willingly 
giving up some purchases considered as superfluous. If this is not the case, 
consumers will not be able to escape from the feeling of being ‘time crushed’ but
rather add to it. For the theatricalization of low prices to succeed, mentalities
will have to undergo a thorough revolution. It will certainly be the most signifi-
cant check to overcome in the next few years to get consumers to accept the
sometimes unpleasant consequences of slowness logistics in terms of poor avail-
ability of products in store.
Conclusion
Praising slowness as a source of competitive advantage may be seen as a provo-
cation or the flights of fancy of an intellectual flight from the real world. Who
would dare pretend that time-based competition is not the rule for firms, in a
world where customers want their needs immediately satisfied? Numerous
works on marketing have continuously stressed for more than 15 years the
volatility of consumer behaviour, according to opportunities offered, without
any attachment or loyalty to brands (Dubois, 1991). Not to look for the maxi-
mum availability of the right product and the right time and place would then be
suicidal, as much for manufacturers as for large retailers. But in a society where
speed is the rule, some firms seem to wish to develop a counter-model based on
a deliberate downgrading of the logistical customer service, to the benefit of a
theatricalization of low prices. Stock outs in store are here managed as a market-
ing variable sending consumers a positive signal of the existence of good 
bargains that they must seize at the right time.
Further analysis of slowness logistics is required in at least two directions. One
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would be to determine the exact performance criteria on which slowness logistics
relies, so as to build monitoring and assessment tools; to give up TBS does not
mean letting events take over by thinking – wrongly – that the slowness competi-
tive advantage cannot be measured. The other would be to better define the 
components of the large retailers’ marketing mix to convince consumers of the
benefits of the new management model, when it could appear as an unacceptable
decline in the level of logistical performance. After prioritizing reliability, quali-
ty and after-sales service dimensions of the customer value, large retailers will
have to learn how to communicate on the price dimension as a source of customer
value, by using as leverage the marketing influence dimension.
More generally, the logic of slowness logistics seems to be found in some
other industries, such as the e-retailing industry. It can be presumed that, for
example, if the waiting time for buying an e-plane ticket were artificially
increased by the e-retailer (with slower loading time of the fare page, or payment
page), consumers would more likely buy the ticket whatever its cost, even if the
price stopped being a bargain.4 Trying consumers’ patience while pushing the
low-cost discourse therefore seems to be a marketing strategy found to be 
efficient in many different contexts. This type of argument shows that the idea
of slowness logistics is not just provocative, but has already proven to be a ‘uni-
versal way of thinking’. This certainly opens important research avenues well
beyond the field of logistics management and SCM.
Notes
For thoughtful comments on an earlier draft, I am grateful to Barbara Adam, Michelle
Bergadaà, Bertrand Urien, and two anonymous referees of Time & Society.
1. According to Christopher (2005: 17), a supply chain is ‘the network of organizations
that are involved, through upstream and downstream linkages, in the different
processes and activities that produce value in the form of products and services in the
hands of the ultimate consumer’.
2. The Royer Act and the Raffarin Act are a perfect symbol of the French
Administration’s recurrent interventionist policy in controlling the retailing industry
to prevent its unchecked development. The Royer Act of December 27, 1973 intro-
duced a procedure before any authorization to open new stores; the act imposes an
administrative authorization for any creation or extension of a store whose sales area
is above 1,500 m2 in towns with more than 40,000 inhabitants, or above 1,000 m2 in
towns with less than 40,000 inhabitants. The purpose of the Royer Act is to see that
the establishment of factory outlets, hypermarkets, malls, etc., does not cause the 
disappearance of small shops in town centres. The Raffarin Act of July 5, 1996
restated the philosophy in the Royer Act, but defined more stringent sanctions in case
of interference with fair competition, and reduced the authorization thresholds from
1500 m2 to 300 m2 for opening new stores.
3. In this respect, seasonal events such as ‘la rentrée’, ‘les foires aux vins’ and ‘le mois
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du blanc’ are uniquely French, with no equivalent in the UK. If logistical cost 
reduction were to become the priority, they could well become the norm.
4. I thank one of the two anonymous referees for pointing out to me this possible 
extension of the logic of slowness logistics to marketing strategies in the e-retailing
industry.
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